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ASHLEY HOUSTON*
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.: The
Supreme Court Declines the Opportunity to
Finally Set the Record Straight and Articulate
One Clear Standard for Determining Obviousness
in Patent Cases
IN KSR INTERNATIONAL CO. v. TELEFLEX INC.,' THE United States Supreme Court
considered whether the Federal Circuit's application of the teaching, suggestion, or
motivation test ("TSM test") was consistent with section 103 of the Patent Act 2 and
Supreme Court precedent.' The Court held that the TSM test is consistent with
section 103 and precedent when applied as a general principle and not as a rigid
rule.' In so holding, the Court implemented an unworkable standard which per-
mits the courts to unnecessarily apply two separate yet synonymous tests.' A better
standard would completely eliminate the TSM test so as to promote consistency
and uniformity while avoiding hindsight.6
I. THE CASE
In 2000, General Motors selected KSR International Co. ("KSR") to manufacture
and supply adjustable pedal assemblies for the Chevrolet and GMC light truck
lines, both utilizing electronic throttle controls.' To satisfy this request, KSR added
pedal position sensors to its previously used and patented adjustable pedal assem-
J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland School of Law, May 2009; B.A., English, James Madison
University, May 2006.
1. 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
3. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1745-46.
4. Id.
5. See infra Part IV.A.
6. See infra Part IV.B. Hindsight bias refers to the natural inclination to believe something is obvious
after it has been invented. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Ideas into Action: Implementing Reform of the Patent System:
Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 887-88
(2004).
7. Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 581, 584-85 (E.D. Mich. 2003). Two years earlier, Ford
Motor Company hired KSR to supply an adjustable pedal system for their vehicles with cable-actuated throttle
controls. Id.
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blies.' In essence, KSR designed a product combining an adjustable pedal with an
electronic pedal position sensor.'
On November 18, 2002, Teleflex Inc. ("Teleflex"), a competitor designer and
manufacturer of adjustable pedals, filed an action against KSR, alleging that KSR
infringed Teleflex's Engelgau patent (the "Patent"), ° which combined an electronic
sensor and a gas pedal." Teleflex argued that KSR infringed the Patent when it
added an electronic sensor to its own, previously designed pedal assembly.' 2 KSR
filed a motion for summary judgment based on invalidity, contending that the
Patent was "invalid because it would have been obvious to someone with ordinary
skill in the art of designing pedal systems to combine an adjustable pedal system
with an electronic pedal position sensor.""
In granting KSR's motion and finding the Patent invalid on grounds of obvi-
ousness, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan ap-
plied an obviousness inquiry under section 103, known as the Graham Framework,
8. Id. at 585. KSR had used the adjustable pedal assemblies in 1998 when supplying Ford with adjustable
pedal assemblies for a number of its cars. Id. Because the engines of those vehicles used cable-actuated throttle
controls, KSR added cable-attachment arms to the adjustable pedal assemblies. Id. KSR obtained a patent, '976,
for this development of an adjustable mechanical pedal. Id. at 584. For the GMC trucks, KSR added a modular
sensor to the '976 patent. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. The Engelgau patent, also referred to as the '565 patent, involves an adjustable electronic pedal. Id.
In the patent specification, the pedal is described as a less expensive, easier-to-package vehicle control pedal
assembly that uses fewer parts than the already existing pedal assemblies. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S.
Ct. at 1727, 1736 (2007). The US Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") originally rejected on grounds of
obviousness Claim 4 of the patent, which the district court and Supreme Court interpreted as a disclosure of a
position adjustable pedal assembly involving an electronic pedal position sensor attached to a fixed pivot point
of the pedal assembly. Id. At that point, however, the claim did not specify that the sensor would be placed on a
fixed pivot point and as such, the PTO found the claim to be a mere combination of Redding and Smith, two
prior art references. Id. Once this distinction became known, the PTO allowed the patent; however, neither the
patent itself nor its prosecution of the Patent addressed Asano, a prior patent involving an adjustable pedal
with a fixed pivot point. Id. The PTO was not given notice of Asano, but the Supreme Court did have notice of
Asano. The teachings of Asano ultimately contributed to the Supreme Court finding the Patent obvious. Id. at
1737.
11. Teleflex, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 585. Prior to filing the complaint, Teleflex assigned the '239, '695, and '565
patents to Technology Holding Corp. ("THC"), a Delaware subsidiary of Teleflex. Id. Since THC was not a
party to the suit at the time the complaint was filed, KSR filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. The Court denied the motion as to the '565 patent, finding THC had granted an exclusive
license that provided Teleflex standing in the action. Id. As for the '239 and '695 patents, the Court found that
Teleflex failed to provide sufficient documentation to show that it had been given an exclusive license for those
patents. Id. After the Court ordered Teleflex to show cause for the exclusive licenses relating to those patents,
the parties "stipulated the dismissal" of both. Id. Shortly thereafter, THC joined Teleflex as Plaintiffs to the '565
patent suit. Id.
12. Id. Claim 4 of the patent "describes [this design as] a position-adjustable pedal assembly with an
electronic pedal position sensor attached to the support member of the pedal assembly. Attaching the sensor to
the support member allows the sensor to remain in a fixed position while the driver adjusts the pedal." Id. at
586-87.
13. Id. at 587.
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
ASHLEY HOUSTON
which looks to (1) the scope and content of the prior art; 4 (2) the level of ordinary
skill in the art; (3) the differences between the prior art and the claimed invention;
and (4) the extent of any objective indicia of non-obviousness.' 5 Under this analy-
sis, the court concluded that there was little difference between the Patent and the
prior art's teachings.' 6 The court then applied the TSM test and found it satisfied.'7
The court concluded that "a hypothetical person with an undergraduate degree in
mechanical engineering or an equivalent amount of industry experience who has
familiarity with pedal control systems ... would have found it obvious" to build
upon prior art, such as the Asano'5 model, which involved an adjustable pedal
assembly mounted to a permanently placed pivot mechanism. 9 As such, the court
found Claim 4 of the Patent obvious and granted KSR's motion for summary judg-
ment based on invalidity.2" Teleflex then appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which reversed the district court's decision.2'
The Federal Circuit rejected the district court's application of the TSM test, ex-
plaining that a proper analysis under the TSM test requires the court to find a
specific motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art in the prior art itself, in
the nature of the problem being solved by the patent, or the knowledge of a person
having ordinary skill in the art ("phosita").22 The Federal Circuit also rejected the
lower court's analysis of the nature of the problem to be solved because proper
14. Prior art consists of past inventions, against which the new and nonbvious requirements of a claimed
invention are judged. DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 80 (Foundation Press 2004)
(1998).
15. Teleflex, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 587.
16. Id. at 589. The identified prior art is as follows: the Asano patent, "a position adjustable pedal assembly
pivotally mounted on a support member" with the pivot position remaining constant and the pedal arm
moving along the glide; the '892 and '899 patents, "electronic pedal position sensors" utilizing electronic throt-
de controls and connections; the '936 patent, "a non-adjustable pedal assembly incorporating a pedal position
sensor" inside the passenger side compartment; the Redding patent, "an adjustable accelerator pedal assembly"
in which the pivot moves along with the pedal arm; the Smith patent, "an electronic pedal position sensor
attached to an accelerator pedal support bracket and engaged with a pivot shaft"; and the 503 Series, "modular
pedal position sensors" that demonstrate the transmission of an "electronic signal to an electronic throttle
control based on the degree the pivot shaft turns in response to depression of the accelerator pedal." Id. at
589-90.
The court believed that Asano had taught everything noted in the claim with the exception of the sensor
being used to detect the pedal's position and to transmit that information to the computer controlling throttle.
Id. The court found that the '068 patent as well as Chevrolet's sensors previously utilized this added feature. Id.
at 593.
17. Id. at 593-95. The court reasoned that it was inevitable, given the state of the industry and the prior
art's teachings, that electronic sensors would be combined with adjustable pedals Id. See infra, Part II.C., for a
description of the TSM test.
18. See supra note 16, for a description of the Asano patent.
19. Teleflex, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
20. Id. The court explained that the PTO would have found the patent to be an obvious combination of
Asano and Smith if Asano had been included on the patent application. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct.
1727, 1738 (2007). The court also noted that the commercial success of the pedals did not undermine the
finding of obviousness. Id.
21. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282, 290 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
22. Id. at 288.
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application of the TSM test demands that the prior art references specifically ad-
dress the precise problem that the current patent addresses. 3 Because the prior art
references did not address the precise problem that KSR intended the Patent to
solve, there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was a teach-
ing, suggestion, or motivation for phosita to build upon the prior art by attaching
an electronic control to the support structure of the pedal assembly. 4 KSR ap-
pealed, challenging the court's application of the TSM test.25
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to decide whether the
Federal Circuit addressed the question of obviousness in a manner inconsistent
with section 103 and Supreme Court precedent.26
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
At the origin of the patent system's development is a desire to "foster and reward
invention," to "promote[ ] disclosure of inventions, to stimulate further innovation,
:.. to permit the public to practice the invention once the patent expires," and to
"assure that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the pub-
lic." '27 In conjunction with these goals, the system limits the issuance of patents to
those inventions that are adequately disclosed, new, nonobvious, useful, and of a
patentable subject matter.25 Of these requirements, the nonobviousness require-
ment for patentability is regarded as the most challenging for the applicant to sat-
isfy. 29 Contributing to the overall challenge is the recurring need for clarity,
consistency, and stability that has relentlessly plagued the nonobviousness standard
throughout its many transformations." Initially, common law introduced the stan-
dard for nonobviousness.3" Then, the legislature codified that standard in section
103 of the Patent Act.32 In turn, the Supreme Court modified section 103 into a
factor oriented framework.33 Shortly thereafter, the Federal Circuit presented a new
standard for determining obviousness.34 These varying sources of influence ulti-
mately wed the standard to ambiguity and inconsistency.
23. Id. at 288-89. The Patent sought to provide a simpler, smaller, cheaper adjustable electronic pedal. Id.
According to the court, none of the prior art addressed the problems of simplicity, size, or cost of adjustable
electronic pedals. Id. Therefore, the court reasoned that the inventor would not have looked to the prior art for
a teaching, suggestion, or motivation. Id.
24. Id. Teleflex had one expert who said Claim 4 was a "simple, elegant, and novel combination of fea-
tures." Id. at 290 (quoting Radcliffe Decl. 1 15). Another expert said that Claim 4 was nonobvious because the
sensor was mounted on the support bracket rather than the pedal itself. Id.
25. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734-35 (2007).
26. Id.
27. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
28. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 14, at 73.
29. Id. at 532.
30. See infra Part II.A.-C.
31. See infra Part [I.A.
32. Id.
33. See infra Part lI.B.
34. See infra Part lI.C.
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A. The Common Law Principle of Patentability Identified a New Requirement for
Patentability That Developed Into Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952
Recognizing that patentability required more than mere novelty" and utility,36 the
Supreme Court in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood37 denied the patentability of a doorknob
invention, in which the inventor replaced the metallic knob of the original door-
knob design with a clay or porcelain knob." The Court noted that the "degree of
skill and ingenuity" implemented by the inventor must surpass that of "an ordinary
mechanic acquainted with the business."'39 Although Hotchkiss introduced this new
requirement for patentability, it did so with little instruction and left lower courts
with an ambiguous and vague standard easily manipulated by judges attempting to
convey varying preferred meanings.4"
Shortly after Hotchkiss, the Supreme Court in Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Auto-
matic Devices Corp.4 amended the "degree of skill and ingenuity" standard into a
"flash of creative genius" standard.42 Irrespective of this heightened standard, ambi-
guity continued to tarnish the obviousness analysis. 3 The Court again expanded
the definition of an invention in 1950 when it reasoned in Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp." that the "conjunction or concert of
known elements [is patentable] only when the whole in a way exceeds the sum of
its parts. ' The Court had set forth yet another judicial standard, but in doing so,
warned that legislative action would be necessary to achieve clarity, consistency,
and stability.46
Reacting to the need for a uniform standard of patentability, the legislature en-
acted the Patent Act of 1952,"7 comprised of three sections, the last of which ad-
dresses the requirement of nonobvious subject matter:
35. Novelty is a requirement of patentability asking "whether each and every component of a patent claim
is shown in a single reference." Hal Milton & Patrick Anderson, The KSR Standard for Patentability, 89 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 615, 617 (2007).
36. Utility refers to the usefulness of a claimed invention. Before a claimed invention is considered patent-
able, it must be seen as useful in that it functions according to its intended purpose. CHISUM ET AL., supra note
14, at 735.
37. 52 U.S. 248 (1850).
38. Id. at 271-72.
39. Id. at 267.
40. CHISUM ET AL, supra note 14, at 533-34.
41. 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
42. Id. at 91.
43. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 14, at 534. During this time "the obviousness standard took on many forms
including: inventive genius, creative work of the inventive faculty, a flash of creative genius, or" an invention
standard. Michael Astorino, Obviously Troublesome: How High Should the Standard be for Obtaining a Patent, 89
j. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 239, 242 (2007). The standard was in such dire need of reform that President
Roosevelt appointed a National Patent Planning Commission to decrease the ambiguity accompanying the
standard. Id.
44. 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
45. Id. at 152.
46. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 14, at 535.
47. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952).
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A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed
or described as set forth in § 102 of this title, if the differences between subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which subject matter pertains. Pat-
entability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was
made.4"
Although the statute removed all preexisting tests and codified the standard for
obviousness, it was nonetheless ambiguous and required explanation. This needed
explanation came fourteen years later in the form of an objective framework pro-
posed by the Supreme Court.
B. The Supreme Court Adopted the Act's Nonobviousness Standard and
Articulated a General Approach to the Issue of Obviousness Under
Section 103
Concluding that the purpose of section 103 was to codify "judicial precedents em-
bracing the Hotchkiss condition" and to mandate the obviousness inquiry as a "pre-
requisite to patentability,"'49 the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co.5" set
forth a new, objective framework for determining patentability under the stricture
of section 103."' Under this framework, the court determines the question of obvi-
ousness according to underlying issues of fact, namely: (1) the "scope and content
of the prior art;" (2) the "differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;"
(3) the "level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art;" and (4) the extent of secondary
considerations such as "commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, [and the]
failure of other[ ] [inventions]. 52
The Graham Framework became the backbone of the Supreme Court's obvi-
ousness analysis. For instance, the Supreme Court in United States v. Adams53 fol-
lowed the Graham Framework when considering the validity of a patent for a non-
rechargeable, water-activated, electrical battery "compris[ing] two electrodes - one
made of magnesium, the other of cuprous chloride."5 ' The Court initially identified
the prior art references relevant to the subject matter or the nature of the problem
being solved.55 Next, the Court specified the content of each of the prior art refer-
ences, noting what each patent taught.56 The Court was then able to ascertain the
48. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
49. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
50. 383 U.S. 1.
51. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 14, at 537.
52. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18.
53. 383 U.S. 39 (1966).
54. Id. at 42.
55. Id. at 45-48.
56. Id.
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differences between the prior art and the patent at issue, finding that although
prior art addressed each element of the Adams battery individually, the combina-
tion of those elements produced effects far surpassing those of the prior art. 7 The
Court also considered the knowledge of a phosita and concluded that such a person
would believe that "batteries which continued to operate on an open circuit and
which heated in normal use were not practical" and that "water-activated batteries
were successful only when combined with electrolytes detrimental to the use of
magnesium.""s These beliefs would "deter [such a person] from any investigation
into such a combination as is used by Adams;" therefore, the combination was not
obvious to a phosita5 9 Finally, the Court looked to secondary factors, such as ex-
pert testimony revealing the experts' initial disbelief in the invention.' Against this
totality of information compiled under the Graham Framework, the Court con-
cluded that the Adams patent was nonobvious and therefore valid.6 Although the
Supreme Court has been consistent in applying the above obviousness analysis, the
Federal Circuit has not adopted the Graham Framework, thereby diverging from
Supreme Court precedent.
C. The Federal Circuit Adopted its Own Test for Establishing Nonobviousness
Feeling as though ambiguity continued to permeate throughout the obviousness
analysis, and hoping to do away with such ambiguity, the legislature passed the
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982,62 establishing the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and granting it nationwide jurisdiction over appeals
in patent cases.63 With this power, the Federal Circuit adopted the TSM test.64 In
the court's first case dealing with section 103, Chief Judge Markey turned a blind
eye to Supreme Court precedent.65 Instead of applying Graham, Judge Markey fol-
lowed the newly formulated TSM test, under which the movant, relying on multi-
ple prior art references to establish obviousness, must also establish some teaching,
57. Id. at 48-52.
58. Id. at 52.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Pub L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
63. John A. O'Brien, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex - The Standard of Nonobvious Subject Matter, 909 PRACTIS-
ING L. INST. PATS., COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARKS, & LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 497, 507 (2007).
64. Milton & Anderson, supra note 35, at 618.
65. O'Brien, supra note 63, at 508.
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suggestion, or motivation that would have led a phosita66 to combine the elements
of the relevant prior art in such a way.67
Advocating for the TSM test, the Federal Circuit in In re Kahn6" identified the
test's goals of eliminating the use of hindsight and increasing the uniformity and
predictability of obviousness determinations.69 Contrary to these goals, the Federal
Circuit complicated the standard in 2002 when it again amended the test and held
that the motivation to combine "could not be resolved on subjective belief and
unknown authority," but instead must be "based on objective evidence of record." '7
Although the Federal Circuit purports to follow a straightforward approach to the
TSM test, under which the teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine may be
found either explicitly or implicitly in the prior art references themselves, in the
knowledge of a phosita, or in the nature of the problem to be solved,7' it has strug-
gled to apply the TSM test consistently with regard to the objective evidence
requirement.72
66. An element of the section 103 obviousness determination is "whether a person having ordinary skill in
the art, (phosita) to which the claimed invention pertains would have found the claimed invention obvious."
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 14, at 620-21. This "person" is a hypothetical person, not the inventor, having
ordinary skill in the art. Id. In determining what skill is ordinary, the Federal Circuit considers the types of
problems prevalent in the art, the solutions to those problems that prior art has addressed, the speediness of
innovations, the technology involved, and the "education level of the workers in the field." Id. at 622 (quoting
Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). This hypothetical person is pre-
sumed to have full knowledge of all prior art and what it teaches. Id. He is also presumed to have full knowl-
edge of any field of art relating to his field of art. Id.
67. Steven P. Smith & Kurt R. Van Thomme, Bridge Over Troubled Water: The Supreme Court's New Patent
Obviousness Standard in KSR Should be Readily Apparent and Benefit the Public, 17 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 127,
168-70 (2007).
68. 441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
69. Id. at 986.
70. In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
71. D. Benjamin Borson, KSR v. Teleflex, Inc.: The Supreme Court Reviews Obviousness, 89 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 523, 525 (2007); see also In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("The
motivation, suggestion or teaching may come explicitly from statements in the prior art, the knowledge of one
of ordinary skill in the art, or, in some cases the nature of the problem to be solved .... Whether the Board
relies on an explicit or an implicit showing, it must provide particular findings related thereto.").
72. Some Federal Circuit decisions allow for implicit evidence of a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to
combine to be found in the prior art itself, the nature of the problem to be solved, or in the knowledge of the
phosita. See Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (affirming the PTO's obvi-
ousness finding where "[tihere is flexibility in [the] obviousness jurisprudence [in that] a motivation may be
found implicitly in the prior art," and a person having ordinary skill in the art would have known to combine
the references); In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding that "the overall disclosures, teachings,
and suggestions of the prior art, and the level of skill in the art-i.e., the understandings and knowledge of
persons having ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention-support the legal conclusion of obvi-
ousness"); Cross Med. Prods. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding
the claimed invention obvious and explaining that "the motivation to combine need not be found in prior art
references," but may also be found in the knowledge of the phosita).
Others stress that there must be an explicit finding in the prior art for the invention to be seen as obvious.
See In re Huston, 308 F.3d 1267, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (requiring that the teaching, suggestion, or motivation
to combine come explicitly from prior art); In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that the
finding of obviousness requires "some concrete evidence in the record" and not "general conclusions about
what is 'basic knowledge' or 'common sense' to one of ordinary skill in the art"); In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350,
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
ASHLEY HOUSTON
The Federal Circuit created the TSM test and would therefore presumably be the
most qualified to apply the test; however, that presumption fails as the Federal
Circuit has been wholly unable to rid the test of ambiguity and to apply it in a
uniform fashion. The Supreme Court in KSR evaluated the inconsistencies and
declared which application of the TSM test complies with section 103 and Supreme
Court precedent."
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.," the United States Supreme Court reversed
the judgment of the Federal Circuit, holding that the question of obviousness had
been addressed in a "narrow, rigid manner inconsistent with section 103" and Su-
preme Court precedent.7" The Court further held that KSR presented convincing
evidence that attaching an available sensor to the fixed pivot point of the Asano
pedal was an obvious development to a phosita and that the benefit of such a
development was also obvious; therefore the Patent was obvious and thus invalid.76
Finally, the Court held that summary judgment is appropriate where the obvi-
ousness of the claim is apparent in light of the non-materially disputed content of
the prior art, scope of the patent, and level of ordinary skill.77 Writing for a unani-
mous Court, Justice Kennedy immediately rejected the rigid approach of the Fed-
eral Circuit and instead emphasized the need to apply the TSM test as a general
rule so as to comport with the Graham Framework."
The court began its analysis by noting four errors, each stemming from the Fed-
eral Circuit's "narrow conception of the obviousness inquiry"79 and causing the
court to apply a test inconsistent with section 103 and Supreme Court precedent."s
Correcting those errors, the Court explained that any need or problem, addressed
by the patent and known to a phosita during the time of the invention, can "pro-
1358 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (denying the Board's finding of obviousness where the Board did not identify a "specific"
principle or understanding derived from prior art that would motivate a person having ordinary skill in the art
to combine references).
73. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 U.S. 1727, 1746 (2007).
74. 127 S. Ct. 1727.
75. Id. at 1746. The Court opined that "diversity of inventive pursuits and of modern technology counsels
against limiting the analysis" to a rigid formula requiring explicit showings of teaching, suggestion, and motiva-
tion. Id. at 1741.
76. Id. at 1746.
77. Id. at 1745-46.
78. Id. at 1739.
79. Id. at 1741.
80. Id. at 1743. The first error related to the lower court's holding that courts and patent examiners should
look exclusively to the specific problem the patentee was trying to solve. Id. at 1742. The court next erred in
assuming that "a person of ordinary skill attempting to solve a problem will be led only to those elements of
prior art designed to solve the same problem." Id. The third error was the Federal Circuit's conclusion that a
patent claim cannot be found obvious based solely on a showing that it was obvious to try the combination of
elements. Id. The fourth error was the court's flawed reaction to the risk of hindsight bias. Id.
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vide a reason for combining the elements in the manner claimed."'" The Court next
noted its expectation that one designing an adjustable electronic pedal would, in
fact, look to Asano, despite the fact that Asano's acclaimed primary purpose lacked
a direct correlation to the problem the patent was solving. 2 The Asano design
illustrated an adjustable pedal with a fixed pivot point; therefore a person would
look to each of these elements of prior art. 3 Additionally, the Court clarified that a
patent may be obvious if the combination of elements is obvious. 4 Finally, the
Court explained that a fact finder's common sense, as well as her awareness of the
possibility of hindsight bias, renders unnecessary a rigid, preventative rule defying
precedent.8"
Applying these corrections, the Court found the Patent obvious, and thus inva-
lid, as minor differences existed between prior art references86 and the Patent at
issue. 7 Given the increasing demand for electronic pedals and the prior art's teach-
ings of the most effective attachment points for sensors, the Court reasoned that it
would be obvious for a pedal designer of ordinary skill to combine Asano with a
pivot-mounted pedal position sensor.88 The Court then acknowledged the non-
existence of secondary factors disrupting the finding of obviousness.89 Therefore,
the subject matter of the Patent was obvious, and the claim did not satisfy section
103. 90
Lastly, the Court held that although a court may consider expert testimony in
resolving questions of fact for purposes of summary judgment, "the ultimate judg-
ment of obviousness is a legal determination,"' and because "the content of the
prior art, the scope of the patent claim, and the level of ordinary skill in the art are
81. Id. at 1742.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. This could occur if an inventor takes upon himself the testing of predictable solutions to a known
problem for which a solution is adamantly sought. Id.
85. Id. at 1742-43.
86. See supra note 16, for an explanation of the prior art references.
87. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1745.
88. Id. at 1744. The prior art included, among others, the '936 patent, which proposed the idea of placing
the sensor on the pedal device, Smith, which taught designers to place the sensor on the pedal's support
structure, and Rixon, which together with Smith taught that the wires must not chafe against the pedal assem-
blies. Id. These teachings made it evident that sensors would be most effective if placed on a nonmoving part of
the pedal assembly, which would most notably be the pivot point. Id. Since Smith already proposed the idea of
mounting the sensor on the pivot point, this development was an obvious combination of the prior teachings.
Id. at 1744-45. The Court explained that the same result would be reached if the designer began with an
adjustable electronic pedal, one similar to Rixon, and sought to remedy the wire chafing problem. Id. at 1745.
It would be obvious for the designer to follow the teaching of Smith that sensor movement should be avoided
and thus arrive at an Asano like design of an adjustable pedal with a fixed pivot point. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1746.
91. Id. at 1745 (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966)).
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
ASHLEY HOUSTON
not in material dispute, and the obviousness of the claim is apparent in light of
these factors, summary judgment is appropriate." '92
IV. ANALYSIS
Rather than reject the TSM test, the Supreme Court in KSR found it to be consis-
tent with the Graham Framework if applied as a general principle and not a rigid
rule requiring an explicit showing of a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to com-
bine the prior art references.93 In doing so, the Court altered the test in such a way
that it became a meaningless standard when applied in conjunction with the Gra-
ham Factors. The Court should have eliminated the TSM test in its entirety,
thereby encouraging consistency and uniformity while avoiding hindsight.
A. In Its Amended Version, the TSM Test is Meaningless as it Merges into the
Graham Factors, Credits Common Sense, and Maintains Its Non-Essential Nature
The Court's amended version of the TSM test removes the requirement of explicit
findings of a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine prior art references,
thereby creating a test which instructs the courts to consider implicit findings of a
teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine from the prior art references, the
nature of the problem to be solved, or the knowledge of the phosita.94 While articu-
lating this refined TSM test, the Court simultaneously reaffirmed the Graham Fac-
tors,9" which determine obviousness or nonobviousness through an evaluation of
the scope and content of the prior art, the differences between that prior art and
the current claims, the "level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art," and secondary
factors.96 Comparing the two, it becomes evident that they are synonymous tests
with overlapping factors and a shared commitment to common sense analysis.97 In
addition, regardless of its equivalency to the Graham Factors, the TSM test is not
essential to the obviousness inquiry as the courts have repeatedly reached obvi-
ousness decisions without a consistent application of this test.98
1. The TSM Test Merges with the Graham Factors
In essence, the TSM test inquires as to whether the prior art taught, suggested, or
motivated the phosita to combine the prior art; whether the nature of the problem
to be solved taught, suggested, or motivated the phosita to combine the prior art; or
whether the knowledge of the phosita taught, suggested, or motivated the phosita to
92. Id. at 1745-46.
93. Id. at 1741.
94. Id.
95. Andrew Noyes, Judges Ponder Impact of Supreme Court's Patent Ruling, NAT'L. J. CONGRESS DAiLY, Oct.
02, 2007.
96. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.
97. See infra Part W.A.1.-2.
98. See infra Part IV.A.3.
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combine the prior art. Likewise, the Graham Factors look to the scope and content
of the prior art, the difference between the prior art and the claims at hand, and the
level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art to determine whether any of these factors
individually or collectively, make it obvious to the phosita to combine the prior art.
Worded another way, the test asks if the scope and content of the prior art implic-
itly taught, suggested, or motivated a phosita to combine the prior art, if the differ-
ence between the prior art and the current claims implicitly taught, suggested, or
motivated a phosita to combine the prior art, or if the level of ordinary skill in the
art of a phosita implicitly taught, suggested, or motivated the combination. Worded
as such, it becomes clear that "the first three prongs of the Graham obviousness
factors work hand in hand with the Federal Circuit tying its TSM test to each of
them."9
In order to sufficiently evaluate whether there is an implicit teaching, suggestion,
or motivation to combine in the prior art under the TSM test, the decision maker
must be able to recognize the scope, content, teachings, and purpose of the prior
art.' In this way, the TSM test merges with the first Graham factor: the scope and
content of prior art."° '
Likewise, the TSM test's second source in which a teaching, suggestion, or moti-
vation may be implicitly found-the nature of the problem to be solved-merges
into both the first and second Graham factors: the scope and content of the prior
art as well as the difference between the prior art and the claims at issue. Determin-
ing the scope and content of the prior art, which reveals the problems solved by
such prior art, and then noting the differences between those problems and the
claims at issue will foster the identification of an implicit teaching, suggestion, or
motivation in the nature of the problem being solved.
The third factors under each test are directly synonymous because each requires
the determination of the level of knowledge or ordinary skill of a person having
ordinary skill in the pertinent art. While Graham emphasizes the question of
whether the other factors in their entirety would make it obvious to a person hav-
ing ordinary skill in the pertinent art to combine the prior art, and the TSM test
concentrates more specifically on the question of whether the knowledge of that
phosita would in itself teach, suggest, or motivate the phosita to combine the prior
art, the underlying focus of each standard is the knowledge of the phosita. °2
99. Smith & Van Thomme, supra note 67, at 165.
100. See Dystar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (recogniz-
ing TSM as a "subsidiary requirement" of Graham); McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d. 1339, 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that the suggestion to combine is part of the scope and content of the prior art as well
as the level of skill in the art); Monarch Knitting Mach. Corp. v. Sulzer Morat GmbH., 139 F.3d. 877, 881-83
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (recognizing the suggestion to combine prior art as part of Graham's first factor, scope and
content of prior art).
101. See supra note 100.
102. See supra note 66 for a discussion on phosita.
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As a result, teaching, suggestion, or motivation is nothing more than an explicit
or implicit factor that makes it obvious to a phosita to combine the elements of
prior art; therefore, the tests are essentially the same.
2. The TSM Test and the Graham Framework Consider Common Sense
An offset of the overlapping factors and the allowance of implicit findings is the
role that common sense now plays in each test. Recognizing this change, the Su-
preme Court in KSR declared that its precedents "make clear ... [that] the analysis
need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the
challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps
that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ."'' 3 The Court was in fact
rejecting the requirement of explicit-therefore objective " 4-findings while high-
lighting the importance of implicit findings relating to the subjective inquiry of
common sense. Under the newly flexible TSM test, the "actual knowledge and crea-
tivity" of the phosita can be taken into account.' 5 The implicit TSM test permits an
inquiry into what the phosita would know-hence the common knowledge of the
phosita-which is the exact inquiry required under Graham.°6 As stated by Justice
Alito, "[o]nce you define the teaching, suggestion, and motivation test that way so
that it can be implicit, it can be based on common sense[;] I don't quite under-
stand the difference between [an implicit TSM test] and simply asking whether [the
combination is] obvious."0 7
By refusing to reject either test, the Court simply modified the TSM test so that it
would be consistent with the Graham Framework, and the courts could apply ei-
ther test, performing the same analysis for each. Under this construction, the TSM
test is practically meaningless.' 0 The TSM test merely reiterates the Graham Fac-
tors, using different but synonymous rhetoric.
3. The TSM Test is Not Essential to the Obviousness Inquiry
Several evidentiary pieces indicate that the TSM test is at best unnecessary. The first
piece of evidence alluding to the nonessential quality of the TSM test is the fact that
the Supreme Court does not apply this test when performing its obviousness analy-
103. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007).
104. John S. Goetz, An "Obvious" Misunderstanding: Zurko, Lee and the Death of Official Notice (Part II), 86
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 183, 215 (2004) ("Explicitness is plainly associated with objectivity.").
105. Clara R. Cottrell, A Place to Call Home? Affordable Housing Issues in America: Note: The Supreme Court
Brings A Sea Change With KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 595, 613 (2007).
Under a rigid TSM analysis, the court considers the phosita's knowledge only as it applies to the prior art
references Id. at 612.
106. Id.
107. Steven J. Lee & Jeffrey M. Butler, Teaching, Suggestion and Motivation: KSR v. Teleflex and the Chemical
Arts, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 915, 932 (2007) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at
39-40, KSR, 127 S. Ct. 1727 (No. 04-1350)).
108. Transcript of Oral Argument supra note 107, at 4.
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sis. °9 The test is a mere creation of the Federal Circuit."' Furthermore, even within
the courts of its origin, the Federal Circuit utilizes the TSM test in a mere forty-five
percent of obviousness cases."' Therefore, the TSM test is not a necessary aspect of
the obviousness analysis.
Even more evident of the TSM test's unnecessary presence in the obviousness
analysis is the inconsistency with which the Federal Circuit applies the test." 2 The
Federal Circuit articulates the TSM test as allowing the teaching, suggestion, or
motivation to combine to be found implicitly or explicitly,"3 but in applying the
test, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly contradicted itself, requiring explicit
findings. 4
In KSR, for example, the Federal Circuit rhetorically expanded the principle that
the teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine prior art may be implicit, " ' but
its analysis directly repudiated that rhetoric by prohibiting such implicitness and
instead requiring explicit, objective findings." 6 KSR highlighted this prevalent in-
congruity between the rhetoric and the actual application of the test."7 Against the
Federal Circuit's allegation that the teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine
may be found either explicitly or implicitly in the prior art references themselves, in
the knowledge of the phosita, or in the nature of the problem to be solved, the
Federal Circuit has in fact required "an actual evidentiary showing that points un-
equivocally to the present invention."" 8
Moreover, although the Federal Circuit claims that the teaching, suggestion, or
motivation to combine "need not be explicit in prior art references, but might
instead be found in "the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art" or in "the
nature of the problem to be solved," it has simultaneously reversed most obvi-
ousness findings that were based upon skill level rather than prior art, claiming that
in such decisions, the United States Patent and Trademark Office was "falling into
the hindsight trap."" 9
The lack of consistent interpretation and application of the TSM test has led to
numerous variations of the test. A test with so many variations cannot be an essen-
109. See supra Part lI.B.
110. See supra Part II.C.
111. Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical Assessment of
the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REv. 2051, 2055 (2007).
112. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
113. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282, 285 (Fed. Cit. 2005).
114. See supra note 72.
115. Teleflex, 119 F. App'x at 285.
116. Id. at 290 (holding that the district court erred in its lenient application of the TSM test because the
correct standard in fact requires a finding as to the specific understanding or principle within the knowledge of
the person having ordinary skill in the art that would motivate him to combine the prior art).
117. See In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
118. Lee & Butler, supra note 107, at 922; see also supra note 71.
119. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 895 (quoting In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d at 1371); see also In re Dembiczak, 175
F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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tial element of the obviousness inquiry; therefore, Graham is the correct analysis
for courts to follow in determining obviousness. The mere fact that the courts have
applied the TSM test so inconsistently reveals that the obviousness analysis does
not depend upon the test.
B. A Proper Standard for the Supreme Court to Have Proposed Would be One
Rejecting the TSM Test in its Entirety so as to Promote Uniformity and
Consistency While Avoiding Hindsight
Since the very beginning of patentability cases, the standard for determining the
validity of a patent has been regarded as ambiguous and unclear.'20 section 103,
being recognized for "circumscribing the subjectivity with a fence of objective con-
siderations," was an attempt to clarify this standard, but it left the courts uncertain
as to how to apply the standard.2 ' Hoping to resolve any confusion, the Supreme
Court articulated the Graham Framework. 2 The Federal Circuit, however, was not
satisfied with the Supreme Court's framework and created its own standard of ob-
viousness, the TSM test.2 3
This standard encountered confusion as well.'24 In KSR, the Supreme Court was
finally given the opportunity to confront the ambiguity created through the appli-
cation of two separate tests in determining one element of patentability. Instead of
embracing the opportunity to set forth a clear, straightforward test, the Court sim-
ply modified the existing TSM test and concluded that courts could continue to use
the TSM test, together with the Graham Framework, as long as the courts applied
the test as a flexible principle recognizing implicitness.'25 But, as Chief Justice Rob-
erts stated, the implicit TSM test "complicates the inquiry."'26 Therefore, the proper
standard would be one eliminating the TSM test in its entirety so as to promote
uniformity and consistency while avoiding hindsight.
1. Following a Single Test Would Promote Consistency and Uniformity
The Federal Circuit employed the TSM test with the goal of reaching more uni-
formity and consistency among obviousness determinations.'27 Such uniformity is
impossible to achieve when the Supreme Court is applying one test and the Federal
Circuit is applying another. Maintaining and enforcing a consistent application of a
single test is a challenging feat in itself, but the feat becomes all the more challeng-
ing when there are two different tests being applied. Although the tests are near
120. See supra Part 11.
121. Goetz, supra note 104, at 208.
122. Smith & Van Thomme, supra note 67, at 131.
123. Id. at 131-32.
124. See supra Part II.C.
125. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007).
126. Transcript of Oral Argument at 39-40, KSR, 127 S. Ct. 1727 (No. 04-1350).
127. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1734.
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identical in idea, their non-identical rhetoric fosters the likelihood of varying inter-
pretations. The magnitude of potential interpretations when dealing with two sepa-
rate tests breeds skilled and purposeful manipulation. As such, the court system as
a whole would experience greater uniformity and consistency if the Supreme Court
eliminated the TSM test.
Consistency within the Federal Circuit did not exist prior to KSR because the
courts sometimes applied the TSM test in a manner requiring explicit findings and
other times applied the TSM test as a general principle recognizing both explicit
and implicit findings.12 Despite the clear cut wording of the original TSM test, the
Federal Circuit still applied that single test inconsistently. Now, with the KSR hold-
ing, the wording is less clear, and instead of a single test, the courts have two tests
to juggle. Decreasing clarity while increasing options will most definitely lead to
greater inconsistency and non-uniformity.
Furthermore, under the Court's current holding, the Federal Circuit is left with
significant, unregulated liberty that further promotes inconsistency and non-uni-
formity.'29 The Supreme Court articulated and thereafter repeatedly followed the
Graham Framework, thereby making such holdings binding on the Federal Circuit;
however the Federal Circuit deviated from the binding precedent of the Supreme
Court by implementing its own standards. 3 ' The Supreme Court addressed the
Federal Circuit's abandonment of the goal of uniformity in KSR, stating:
Less than a year into its history, in 1983, the Federal Circuit boldly repudiated
the "test of validity of combination patents" that this Court has applied in
Sakraida and Anderson's-Black Rock, and numerous prior cases over a 100+
year period, on the basis that there purportedly was "no warrant" for this
Court's case law treatment of combination patents and the very concept of a
"combination patent" was purportedly "meaningless.'"3
This speaks to the Federal Circuit's willingness to deviate from the Supreme
Court. Moreover, the Supreme Court neglected to amend the standard for over
forty-one years and will not likely review the standard again anytime soon.'32 The
Federal Circuit recognizes this. It also recognizes that it is free to manipulate rul-
ings because as long as it does not blatantly disregard the Supreme Court, the
Court will neither notice nor act upon the disregard.'33 The ambiguity of the KSR
128. See supra note 72 and accompanying text for examples of these contradictions.
129. John F. Duffy, KSR v. Teleflex: Predictable Reform of Patent Substance and Procedure in the Judiciary,
106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 34, 36 (2007).
130. Astorino, supra note 43, at 244.
131. O'Brien, supra note 63, at 511 (internal citations omitted).
132. Harold C. Wegner, Making Sense of KSR and Other Recent Patent Cases, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 39, 40 (2007).
133. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit: Visitation and Custody of Patent Law,
106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIoNs 28, 33 (2007).
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holding is likely to encourage the Federal Circuit's divergence from the Supreme
Court once again. As long as the Federal Circuit interprets and applies the KSR
holding in a manner that is less than overtly outrageous, the Supreme Court will
not likely monitor or correct the Federal Circuit's misapplication of the obvi-
ousness analysis. Under such a system, the Federal Circuit will stray once again, all
along recognizing the unlikely event of reprimand.
To avoid such an outcome, the Supreme Court should have taken the opportu-
nity to put forth a single test in its most basic form so as to reduce the extreme
potential for inconsistency and non-uniformity. The Graham Framework has been
the exclusive analysis conducted by the Supreme Court, and the same should hold
true for the Federal Circuit.
2. Eliminating the TSM Test Will Avoid Hindsight
One of the factors driving the creation of the TSM test was the Federal Circuit's
concern with hindsight'34 and fear that the Graham Framework did not sufficiently
address this concern. 3 ' Contrary to this fear, the Graham Framework, and there-
fore the proposed standard, focuses on the perspective of the phosita at the time of
the invention's creation. '36 Looking to the time of the invention removes the poten-
tial for hindsight consideration. Critics fear that without the requirement of objec-
tive evidence, as required by the TSM test, the courts will be unable to identify
hindsight.'37 Although the Federal Circuit has long underestimated the courts' abil-
ity to avoid hindsight, "' this lack of faith in the courts is unwarranted as "'the habit
of critical, ongoing, reasoned reflections on the contents of common sense'19 is
the very thing that "animates the law."' 40 If properly followed, the Graham Frame-
work, deriving its commands from section 103, will adequately protect against
hindsight because it requires the courts to consider the perspective, including the
common sense, of the phosita at the time of the invention, which "provides an
additional safeguard against hindsight."' 4' The courts are more than capable of
handling such an inquiry, especially given the court's familiarity with similar in-
quiries under negligence and scientor.'42
134. See supra note 6, for an explanation of hindsight.
135. Goetz, supra note 104, at 191.
136. Id. at 190-91.
137. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 6.
138. Astorino, supra note 43, at 246.
139. Patrick McKinley Brennan, Realizing the Rule of Law in the Human Subject, 43 B.C. L. REV. 227, 336
(2002) (quoting MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 238 (1994)).
140. Id. Furthermore, seeing as those that created prior art are inventors and scientists and the like, they
focus their recordings around new, creative concepts that will help science to progress, thereby failing to record
common sense. Astorino, supra note 43, at 245. As such, the available records are often insufficient to disprove
hindsight. Id. Thus the inquiry into common sense is necessary.
141. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 888.
142. Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1996).
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In addition, the secondary factors of the Graham Framework will aid in avoiding
hindsight. The secondary considerations of the Graham Framework include,
among many others, the recognition of the claimed invention's commercial success,
the unresolved needs in the industry for the claimed invention, and the failure of
the prior art to address those needs. 4 These considerations serve to protect against
hindsight considerations.' Looking to objective indicia existing at the time of the
invention will discourage a retrospective evaluation of the alleged invention."' The
Graham Framework is certainly capable of safeguarding against hindsight.'46
V. CONCLUSION
In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., the Supreme Court held that the TSM test
is consistent with section 103 and Supreme Court precedent when applied as a
general principle and not as a rigid formula.'47 This holding rendered the TSM test
meaningless as the TSM test and the Graham Framework became synonymous,
having parallel factors and a mutual appreciation of common sense.4 Providing
the courts with the option of applying two equivalent tests merely complicates the
inquiry and provokes confusion.'49 The Court therefore proposed an unworkable
standard. 5 ' Given the Supreme Court's choice to follow the Graham Framework,
the Federal Circuit's inconsistent application of the TSM test, and the latitude for
divergence when given an option, the Court should have rejected the TSM test and
seized the opportunity to finally set forth a single standard for all courts to fol-
low. '' A proper standard would reject the TSM test entirely so as to encourage
consistency and uniformity while avoiding hindsight.'52
143. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 14, at 565.
144. Id.
145. Edward D. Manzo, A Foreword to: A Panel Discussion on Obviousness in a Patent Litigation: KSR Inter-
national v. Teleflex, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 590, 592 (2007).
146. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 886-88.
147. See supra Part Ill.
148. See supra Part V.A.
149. See supra Part IV.A. 1.
150. See supra Part IV.A.2.
151. See supra Part IV.A.3.
152. See supra Part IV.B.
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